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Since the Millennium Development Goals first met digital media, initiatives harnessing ICTs to improve health 
services, empower civil society, enhance emergency response and increase the competitiveness of small producers have 
proliferated across the Global South. In particular, the widespread adoption of mobile telephony has been increasingly 
shaping aid policies and coalescing strategies of actors driven by diverse aims: Ngo’s cultivating innovation for social 
change, businesspeople reaping profits at the bottom of the pyramid, activists seeking greater political accountability 
and governments (sometime) willing to concede it, but in their own terms. The emphasis on the transformational 
potential of the ICTs often conceals tensions arising from the encounter of different ways of knowing and of acting and 
from the emergence of new socio-technical arrangements in which deep-seated dichotomies are challenged: profit/no-
profit; surveillance/sousveillance; civil society/uncivil society; formal economy/informal economy. Processes of 
appropriation and reshaping of technological innovations problematize linear views of technology transfer based on the 
North-South axis and call upon academics to elaborate new frameworks and methodologies to grasp the ongoing 
transformations. 
The purpose of the panel was to promote a dialogue on the way ICTs are bridging and blurring the boundaries 
between opposed categories, on the expectations ICTs have spurred, and on the practices individuals and communities 
have already developed to make sense of the technologies that surround them. In doing so, it intended to bring to the 
fore approaches developed in different disciplines (from anthropology to economics, from cryptography to political 
science) and in different locations to understand how ICTs can be studied and understood both for the transformative 
potential, but without forgetting how old forms of power and domination learn to thrive in new scenarios and to 
appropriate new tools to support their agenda. Papers for the panel could include issues of design-implementation gaps; 
ICT between power and counterpower; technological gatekeeping in humanitarian spaces; controversial ICT driven 
social changes; hybridization of old and new technologies; changing forms of participation. 
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CHINA AND THE AFRICAN INTERNET:  











Through the lens of China in Africa, this paper explores the transformations in the relationship between 
the Internet and the state. China’s economic success, impressive growth of Internet users and relative 
stability have quietly promoted an example of how the Internet can be deployed within the larger political 
and economic strategies of developing states, moving beyond the democratization paradigm promoted in 
the West. New evidence suggests that this model is becoming increasingly popular, but it is not clear why 
and how it is spreading. 
Through a case study comparison of an emerging democracy, Kenya, and a semi-authoritarian country, 
Ethiopia, where China has recently increased its involvement in the communications sector, this paper 
investigates whether and how the ideas of state stability, development and community that characterize the 
strategies pursued by the Chinese government are influencing and legitimizing the development of a less 
open model of the Internet. It analyses how new ideas, technologies and norms integrate with existing 
ones and which factors influence their adoption or rejection. It is based on fieldwork conducted in 
Ethiopia and in Kenya between 2011 and 2013, where data was collected through mapping Internet related 
projects involving Chinese companies and authorities, analysing Internet policies and regulations, and 
interviewing officials in Ministries of Communication, media lawyers, Internet activists, and Chinese 
employed in the media and telecommunication sector in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
 
 
Since the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which took place in Beijing in 2006, the Chinese 
media have begun a steady march to get closer to Africa and to gain influence in its mediasphere. This process has 
displayed signs of continuity and discontinuity with China’s previous attempts to influence ideas and perceptions on the 
continent. It has included both old and new communication technologies, and has developed through a mix of bold 
policy decisions as well as trials and errors. 
The relocation of the Regional Editorial Office for Africa of the state controlled news agency Xinhua from Paris to 
Nairobi in 2006 represented the first symbolic step of this new strategy.1 The same year, China Radio International also 
began to seek partnerships with national broadcasters in Africa to relay some of its content and make it more accessible 
to local audiences [3]. The expansion of traditional media has been followed by some unprecedented initiatives in the 
new media and telecommunication sector. In 2011, Xinhua launched what it labelled as the first “mobile newspaper” in 
Africa [20]. Developed in Kenya in partnership with Huawei, China’s largest telecommunications and service company, 
and Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile operator, it allowed mobile subscribers to receive news selected by Xinhua via 
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS). The project was only partially successful and it was discontinued in 2012, but it 
signalled a willingness on the part of Chinese companies and media to experiment with new formats and find alternative 
ways to compete in an increasingly crowded “market for loyalties” [14]. Alongside these media initiatives, which have 
been aimed at reaching wider audiences in Africa through different channels, since 2006 the Chinese government and 
Chinese companies have also begun to play an increasingly important role in the continent’s telecommunication sector, 
as symbolized by the multi-billion dollar loan from China’s EXIM Bank to the Ethiopian government’s Ethio-Telecom, 
the country’s sole telecom operator, to increase access to the Internet and mobile phones, a project later undertaken by 
Chinese telecom giants ZTE and Huawei [8]. 
These initiatives present both signs of continuity and discontinuity with the past. China’s diplomatic relations with 
Africa date back to the 1950s and have been characterized from the very beginning by the provision of aid and by 
attempts to communicate not just with elites but with African audiences at large [1] [2]. China’s Prime Minister Chou 
En-lai first articulated China’s strategy of engagement with Africa during his visit to the continent 1964, and, despite 
claims that today’s China is transforming development practice in Africa, the modes of its engagement seems to have 
remained almost unchanged. As Chou’s first two points indicate:   
 
1. the Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing 
                                                 
1 Xinhua’s correspondents had historically been China’s eyes and ears on the continent, even before China had established embassies in Africa, but 
while Xinhua’s had established numerous national bureaux (the first in Egypt in 1956), it had never had a regional office for Africa.  
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aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual and 
helpful to economic cooperation. 
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty and 
independence of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges [9]. 
 
Together with the other six principles, which offer a more detailed indication of the financial instruments that China 
would employ when providing aid and of the lifestyle Chinese workers should adopt abroad, these continue to represent 
the pillars of China’s engagement with the continent also in the new millennium [3]. 
Some important differences, however, do exist between China’s past and present efforts in Africa. I focus on three 
here, which are particularly relevant for the media. The first is the disappearance of ideology from the language of 
China-Africa cooperation. In 1964, together with the eight principles regulating aid and cooperation highlighted above, 
Chou enunciated other five principles substantiating the type of political engagement China was concurrently seeking in 
the continent. The first principle declared that “China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to oppose 
imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence” [9: 8]. China’s efforts in 
Africa during de-colonization were closely linked to its efforts to export and strengthen the socialist revolution in the 
continent [2][19]. Today, these have largely been replaced by admissions of China’s interest in Africa’s resources and 
untapped potential. It is as if the deletion of the socialist cause as the goal of China-Africa engagement had promoted 
the principles of “mutual benefit” and “sovereignty and independence” to the rank of ideological guides of the new 
engagement. 
A second major difference between China’s earlier and current presence in Africa depends on the sheer scale of 
resources China is now able to deploy on the continent. While in the 1960s-1970s China had to partially disengage from 
Africa because of the damage the “great leap forward” and the “cultural revolution” were causing to its own economy 
[16], the 2000s-2010s belong to an era of plenty and Chinese actors, including Chinese media, have been able to invest 
and operate in spaces where others simply do not have the resources to act. 
A final, closely connected, element characterizing contemporary China-Africa relations is the mix of interest and 
fear they are producing among traditional donor countries. While during the Cold-War China’s presence in Africa was 
minimized by the competition between the USA and the USSR [2][16], today’s China is acting as a game changer. In 
2011, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her visit to Tanzania made the USA’s concerns clear about the 
possibilities of a “new colonialism” in Africa and a few months later, UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s warned its 
audience in Lagos that new forms of “authoritarian capitalism” may take root in the continent. Similar concerns have 
been expressed also about the detrimental role China may have in the media sector in Africa, increasing 
authoritarianism and undermining Western efforts to promote openness and freedom of expression [4][11]. These 
concerns are largely based on the assumptions that, as Western countries have tried to promote their models in Africa, 
China will try to export its own. No studies to date, however, have proved this to be the case, and greater empirical 
evidence is needed to fully understand the nature, scope and implications of China’s new role in the African 
mediasphere. This article aims at providing a contribution in this direction, adding to ongoing efforts to understand 
China’s role in Africa in empirical rather than ideological terms that have characterized works in development studies 
and international relations (see for example [1][16]), but have so far had little application to the media. 
 
 
PARTNER, PROTOTYPE OR PERSUADER?  
 
China’s increasing involvement in the media in Africa can represent a critical entry point to understand the broader 
political implications of China–Africa relationship. So far, however, similarly to what has been the case in other areas 
where China has stepped up its presence, there has been a tendency to frame its role in relation to what Western 
countries have done or are doing on the continent, rather than in its own terms. Hillary Clinton has warned Africans 
about risks of a “new colonialism”, a concept that belongs to the history of Europe in Africa rather than of China, while 
David Cameron has spoken of “authoritarian capitalism”, suggesting how China may be adding darker tones to ideas 
the West has tried to promote on the continent for decades.2 In the case of the media, this tendency has been evident in 
the alarms raised about the possibility that China could act as a net exporter of authoritarianism [4], selling its own 
strategies of media development and media control abroad and countering the efforts of countries such as the US and 
the UK which, while stressing the role of the media in the democratization of Africa, have encouraged the adoption of 
aspects characterizing their own media models [14][15]. 
Elsewhere I have proposed a framework that can encourage understanding of Chinese engagement in the African 
mediasphere for its original contributions, and not simply as a negative of the impression left by the West [8]. This 
framework emerged as part of a collective effort among scholars from Africa, China and Europe who gathered in 
Oxford in 2010 to explore ways to approach the study of China’s emerging role in the media in Africa, balancing out 
                                                 
2
 For Hillary Clinton’s remarks see for example Flavia Krause-Jackson, ‘Clinton Chastises China on Internet, African ‘New Colonialism’ 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-11/clinton-chastises-china-on-internet-african-new-colonialism-.html. And for David Cameron’s see Jason 
Groves, ‘Cameron warns Africans over the 'Chinese invasion' as they pour billions into continent’ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2016677/Cameron-warns-Africans-Chinese-invasion-pour-billions-continent.html. Last accessed 13 July. 
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different perspectives and building a shared research agenda. The framework was tested and further refined through 
fieldwork in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.3 This framework breaks down China’s actions on the continent according to 
China’s ability to act as a partner, a prototype, and a persuader. These categories are meant to add greater nuance to the 
analysis of China’s actions on the continent, questioning whether or not China’s role as a partner sponsoring media and 
ICT projects on the continent is facilitating the diffusion of some aspects that characterise its domestic media system, 
rather than assuming this will be the case. They seek to de-ideologise the debate on Western versus Eastern 
developmental models, enabling research findings to show, for example, how the partnership between China and a 
given African country may enhance some aspects of the local media that fit within a Western liberal framework while 
they do not belong to China’s media system. Finally, they allow research to highlight areas of collaboration between 
different development actors, where their relative strengths can enable common goals to be reached, but also common 
patterns of exploitation, where the interventions of different donors contribute to empower specific actors, such as 
government’s, and disempower others. Each category is briefly described below. 
China’s role as a partner is apparent in the resources it provides to African countries to implement projects that are 
deemed important for social and economic development. China has provided substantial financial and technical inputs 
to the expansion of the ICT infrastructure in authoritarian regimes (as in the case of Ethiopia discussed below), but also 
in democratic countries such as Ghana, where its contribution of US$ 180 million has helped realizing one of the most 
ambitious e-government projects in West Africa, reinforcing the ability of the central administration to communicate 
with the peripheries of the state and to provide more effective services to citizens [8]. China has similarly offered 
support to state broadcasters in selected countries: Kenya and Zambia are the most popular examples. Even if China has 
traditionally felt uncomfortable with the term ‘donor’, the activities it sponsors in this area are those usually funded by 
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, and, in some cases, China has offered an alternative to traditional donors for 
African countries willing to develop projects in this area. But while the role of Western donors as partners has usually 
been conditional upon the acceptance of at least some of the elements characteristic of Western media systems, China 
has stressed its intention to maintain a separation between these two dimensions and its willingness to simply respond to 
the demands of its African partners. While this ‘no strings attached’ policy may be consistent, this does not mean that it 
is neutral or free of impact. For example, while Western donors have tended to favour media projects benefitting the 
private sector and the civil society, or projects creating incentives for the state to open a dialogue with other forces in 
society, China has displayed a tendency to privilege government actors, thus increasing governments’ capacity vis-à-vis 
other critical components in the development of a media system. Within this dimension, assessing who benefits from 
China’s increased role as a partner in the media sector becomes particularly important. 
China in also increasingly perceived as a prototype by countries seeking to balance between investment in ICTs and 
containment of the risks of political instability new technologies may bring. In a Wikileaks cable reporting a meeting 
between Sebhat Nega, one of the Ethiopian government’s ideologues, and the then US ambassador Donald Yamamoto, 
for example, Sebhat was reported to have openly declared his admiration for China and stressed that Ethiopia "needs the 
China model to inform the Ethiopian people".4 Some have called its mix of proactive and reactive measures aimed at 
facilitating a controlled expansion of the Internet while leaving the established power structure unchallenged, ‘Chinese 
media model’ [4]. China, however, has historically been reluctant to label its own as a model ready to be exported, 
preferring to refer to specific, but not necessarily cohesive, strategies it has adopted to face the problems it encountered 
throughout its own development. Some of these strategies may be copied and adapted by other countries but Chinese 
leaders and diplomats have tended to challenge the idea of China as an “active teacher”, a term coined by Martha 
Finnemore (1993) [5] to describe international actors attempting to socialize other countries to new ideas and practices. 
Finally, China’s role in Africa can be assessed according to its modality and ability to act as a persuader, shaping 
opinions in ways that favour either its image abroad or a particular agenda it supports. This third dimension is in the 
realm of public diplomacy, which China has stepped up through expanding the reach and content of its international 
broadcasters, including China Central Television and China Radio International, and of its news agency, Xinhua. 
Furthermore, cultural diplomacy has grown through the continued establishment of Confucius institutes, and programs 
that offer scholarships for foreign students and journalists to study in China. Still within its role of persuader, China has 
concurrently pursued a strategy that has distinguished it from its Western competitors, maximising the symbolic value 
of some of the projects it sponsors in Africa, such as roads, theatres, libraries and hospitals, which can symbolize 
China’s support to both literate and illiterate populations. 
This paper adopts this framework to compare the influence of China on the development of telecommunications, 
and of the Internet more specifically, in two countries that have adopted very different approaches towards shaping their 
national information societies. One is Kenya, which is often referred to as Africa’s information hub, because of its 
leading role in promoting local innovation, from mobile banking to crisis responses systems. The other is Ethiopia, the 
only country on the continent where Internet provision is still a state monopoly, whose government actively blocks 
opposition websites, but has also heavily invested in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to improve 
service delivery, even in the most remote areas. 
Since 2006, China has become an important player in both countries, at a diplomatic level, offering an alternative to 
                                                 
3
 More information about the workshop’s programme, participants and outcomes can be accessed at 
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/research/project/china-and-africa-media-policy. Last accessed 10.09.2013. 
4 
Wikileaks cable: #09ADDISABABA149. Last accessed 13 July 2013. 
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traditional donors and allies, especially in moments of political crisis; and as new development actor, sponsoring 
projects that are deemed important by respective governments. This paper seeks to address some of the consequences 
China’s renewed engagement is having on the development of the Internet and of national information societies in both 
countries. It first offers a brief overview of the development of the internet and of telecommunication in Kenya and in 
Ethiopia and then examines which impacts China has had on these countries’ trajectories.  
 
 
THE ETHIOPIAN INTERNET BEFORE CHINA  
 
The development of the Internet in Ethiopia, while similar to the path taken by other authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes, has certain distinctive characteristics. Together with Djibouti, whose population is less than a 
million, Ethiopia is the only other country in Africa with a single, state controlled Internet Service Provider. As argued 
by Ethiopia’s Minister of Information and Communication Technology when he was at the helm of Ethiopia’s ICTT 
Development Agency: “Monopoly is a crucial factor. It is exactly because ICTs are so important and they have the 
capacity to penetrate every aspect of our lives that we have to make sure that it is the state that is in charge of using and 
implementing them. In this phase we cannot leave it to the market. ICTs are too key for our development. They are a 
priority. Behind the decision of leaving the monopoly in the ICTs and telecommunication market there is big 
philosophical thinking. It is not just because we want to make money from the use of telecoms.”5  
The mix of commitment to using new technology and fear that the same technology could unsettle existing power 
structures is reflected in the government’s massive efforts to use digital media in schools and government offices, and 
the neglect of providing reliable and affordable internet connections in the major towns, including the capital [6]. 
Ethiopia has historically had one of the lowest internet penetration rates in the world.6 Despite the very limited diffusion 
of the internet among Ethiopian citizens, in 2006 the government began to actively filter the websites of opposition 
groups and human rights organizations, specifically targeting those that gathered the voices of Ethiopians living abroad 
[13]. 
One reason for blocking these online spaces can be attributed to the composition of the Ethiopian diaspora and to 
the ability of the discourses it articulates to reach beyond the digital media. Similar to other national groups that 
migrated from the Horn, Ethiopians living abroad represent a large and powerful force that have historically been 
involved in wars and politics back home [12]. 
But, in sharp contrast to the cases of Kenya, Eritrea and Somaliland, the great majority of politically-minded 
Ethiopians in the diaspora have opposed the political agenda of the incumbent government led by the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Many posts hosted in online spaces such as Nazret.com or 
Ethiopianreview.com, two popular websites blocked in Ethiopia, aim at the very core of the EPRDF national project, 
refusing to recognize the current government as either legitimate or as the expression of the people’s will. It is not 
uncommon to find a blog post labelling the prime minister as “crime minister” or describing the government as a 
dictatorship led by an ethnic minority. On the other hand, pro-government websites have responded by accusing 
opponents of chauvinism and of encouraging tensions within multi-ethnic Ethiopia similar to those that led to the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994 [7]. 
This vehemence and polarization are not exclusive to online spaces and are evident in the long history of 
engagement — or lack of engagement — between the EPRDF on one hand, and other political forces in Ethiopia and 
the diaspora on the other. Since coming to power the EPRDF has chosen not to negotiate with its adversaries, preferring 
to expand its influence and presence on the ground by delivering progress rather than enlarging its base by 
incorporating new forces and perspectives. This strategy has been applied to both old and new media. After coming to 
power, in response to internal and external pressures, the EPRDF allowed for unprecedented levels of freedom of 
expression, but they did not develop a strategy for reconciling or negotiating with the forces that were defeated or 
marginalized [7]. 
As a result, journalists who were fired from the Ministry of Information and sympathized with those opposed to the 
EPRDF were given the opportunity to set up independent newspapers and use them as platforms for criticizing the 
government. The decision of the EPRDF to ignore these voices, or attack them without engaging with their arguments, 
exacerbated the polarization over time. A few years later, when the first websites were created for an Ethiopian 
audience, the EPRDF took a similar approach and largely ignored them. 
The divide between pro- and anti-government forces has widened over time, having consequences in the aftermath 
of the elections in 2005 when the EPRDF reacted to its substantial electoral losses by imprisoning opponents and firing 
on demonstrators. Prominent journalists were arrested, their papers closed, and, the following year, blogs were also 
blocked to silence all alternative voices. As a result, both old and new media in Ethiopia now carry pro-government 
information or criticism that can be easily managed by the ruling elite and does not challenge its fundamental political 
goals of retaining power and reinforcing its vision of ethnic federalism. 
 
                                                 
5 Interview: Debretsion Gebre Michael, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 10 June 2008. 
6 In 2000 Ethiopia had an internet penetration of 0,02%, which grew to only 1,48% in 2012. Source ITU http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls. Last accessed 13 July 2013.  
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KENYA BEFORE CHINA  
 
The history of the Internet in Kenya cannot be more different. Kenya has been one of the first countries in Africa to 
liberalize telecommunications and to develop a strategy that, while offering limited privileges to the former incumbent 
telecom (Telecom Kenya) such as the monopoly to operate the Internet gateway and backbone until 2004, allowed 
different companies to immediately enter the market, driving down prices and expanding access. As a result Kenya has 
now one of the most competitive Internet sectors in East Africa, with national and international companies offering both 
mobile and landline services. As of 2012 Safaricom had 69% of the Internet market, Aritel 14%, Orange 9% and Essar 
8%. Of these subscriptions, 99% were through mobile [17]. 
The Kenyan government has also taken an innovative approach towards involving a variety of actors, from private 
companies to civil society organizations, in shaping the national internet. Kenya was the first country in Africa to create 
a national Internet Governance Forum after the creation of a Global Internet Governance Forum in 2007. Other 
initiatives, such as Vision 2030 which was set up to define the priorities for Kenya’s development and has placed 
significant emphasis on the role ICT can play in national growth, included consultative processes that could allow a 
variety of actors to contribute shaping the future of the nation. As a result, the evolution of the Kenyan internet has been 
characterized by the inclusion of different interests at different stages, with the state acting both as a facilitator and as a 
driver of innovation.   
 
 
ETHIOPIA AFTER CHINA 
 
After the elections in 2005, which were considered the most democratic and contested in the country, but also led to 
violence and a crackdown on oppositional forces contesting the results, the Ethiopian government became the object of 
increased criticism from the International Community, especially from Western donors, and started looking more 
insistently at China for support. This led to an increasing number of agreements between the two countries and the 
telecommunication sector emerged as one of the most important to realize the EPRDF’s goal to promote economic 
growth and maintaining control over the country. At an ideational level, China’s ability to balance control of 
information and dramatic growth of Internet users started to be looked at as a model and source of legitimation for the 
restrictive practices the Ethiopian government had started employing in the aftermath of the elections. The conception 
of the information society that has progressively emerged in China appeared more in line with the EPRDF’s ambition to 
make Ethiopia a developmental state that could pursue sustained growth and stability. But China has not supported 
Ethiopia only ideationally and indirectly. It has also offered technical and financial means to support the government’s 
strategy. In the second half of the 2000s, as privatized telecommunication markets were booming in most of Africa 
providing cheaper and increasingly reliable access to mobile phones and the Internet, Ethiopia faced the challenge of 
having to balance between its decision to retain monopoly over telecommunication and the inability of expanding 
access without opening to competition. The EPRDF’s stubbornness could not last for long, unless a new partner could 
provide enough resources to introduce a dramatic increase in access and quality of service in a regime of monopoly. 
China obliged by offering the largest loan in the history of telecommunication in Africa: 1.9$ billion to overhaul 
Ethiopia’s telecommunication system, expanding mobile service and Internet connectivity while keeping Ethio-Telecom 
as the only player in the market.7 Some of these resources also went to upgrading the infrastructure on which the e-
government projects were based, allowing a system that many had considered unsustainable to become an even stronger 
component of the government communication strategy towards the periphery. 
The role China had in Ethiopia was of paramount importance. Without China’s support in extending the 
infrastructure and expanding the plan the EPRDF had devised, the government of Ethiopia would have been either 
forced to change its course and liberalize, or to condemn the country to suffer from lack of connectivity to the Internet 
and mobile communication on which many countries on the continent have been relying to support both economic 
growth and state operation.  
 
 
KENYA AFTER CHINA  
 
Given the different context in which the Internet developed in Kenya, the role China came to play was significantly 
different from Ethiopia, but also presented some elements of similarity. As in Ethiopia, China has been deeply involved 
in the extension of internet connectivity in different capacities. First, through telecom companies Huawei and ZTE. 
Together with French company Sagem, they participated in the first National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure 
(NOFBI) expansion, brining fibre optic to the main urban centres and allowing a first series of e-government projects to 
be delivered regionally.8 The country was split into three sections namely Western Kenya, Coast and North Eastern, and 
                                                 
7 See Zhao Lili, ‘Contributing to the Development of Ethiopia with Wisdom and Strength’ 
http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/endata/magazine/ztetechnologies/2009year/no6/articles/200906/t20090612_172517.html.  Last accessed 13 July 2013. 
8 See, for example, Okuttah Mark, ‘Telkom Kenya set to run fibre network on behalf of government’ http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-
News/Telkom-Kenya-set-to-run-fibre-network-on-behalf-of-government/-/539550/929626/-/m96mry/-/index.html. Last accessed 13 July 2013. 
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Central — each region handled by one company. Sagem has laid out cables in Coast and North Eastern, Huawei in 
Nairobi and Central, and ZTE in Western Kenya. Also investors such as internet service providers (ISPs) and 
telecommunication operators have benefited as NOFBI lowered the cost of entry to business. A second round of NOFBI 
(known as NOFBI II) was directly funded with Chinese resources. In 2012 China’s EXIM Bank provided a $71 million 
loan to support further extension to 36 administrative district centres across the country, with the objective of allowing 
also people in remote areas to access faster internet. A condition for the loan was that the implementing agency had to 
be Huawei, which is now in charge of the realization of the project.9 As in Ethiopia, the Chinese government and 
Chinese companies have thus supported the expansions of government led initiatives aimed at extending Internet 
connectivity and improving e-government services. In the Kenyan case, however, Chinese support has fitted in a much 
wider context, where a plurality of actors have been competing to offer better services at lower prices. For example, 
soon after the signing of the agreement for NOFBI II, Kenya’s leading telecom operator, Safaricom, decided to invest 
additional $95 million to build an additional 2,400 kilometre fibre optic cable to support its growing customer base. 
Interestingly, a large share of the contract has been assigned on a commercial basis to Huawei, which had already 
worked in collaboration with Safaricom to roll out the 4G network at a cost of $143 million. A remaining share of 
Safaricom’s expansion project was assigned to Ericsson.10 
As it had been the case in Ethiopia, after Kenya’s highly contested and violent elections, that took place in 2007 
and lead to numerous deaths and displacements and to condemnation from the international community, the relationship 
between the Kenyan government and the Chinese government increased both in quantity and in quality. This is mostly 
connected to the Chinese policy of providing aid and engaging in agreements without any strings attached. Therefore, as 
relations with governments such as the US and the UK reached a low point in the aftermath of the elections and later 
with the indictment of the two presidential candidates Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto by the International Criminal 
Court in relation to the alleged role they played in the incidents of 2007-08, China managed to keep a low profile, 
stressing its faith in the legitimacy of Kenyan institutions.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: GLOBAL AND NATIONAL RHETORIC OF THE INTERNET  
 
Both in the case of the Kenyan and of Ethiopian governments, the violence that followed their respective elections 
was employed as a reason to stress the potentially disruptive role that technology, including the Internet, could play in 
increasing divisiveness and harm peace. While in the case of Ethiopia this discourse had been used for a long time to 
justify state monopoly, Kenya, a country that had heavily invested in the idea of an open internet, woke up to a new 
reality and progressively developed a new discourse framing peace as the overarching goal each Kenyan, from media 
houses to bloggers to telecom operators, should give priority to in shaping the country’s future. As one interviewer put 
it, “Kenya has been slowly sliding from democracy to a peaceocracy”. This rhetoric was employed to justify for 
example the censoring of thousands of SMS considered harmful and inciting ethnic hatred or to ask media houses to 
downplay cases of ethnic violence still happening in the country.11 In both the Ethiopian and the Kenyan case, however, 
it was not just incumbent governments, but also Western donors that stressed the importance of creating mechanisms 
that could lead to peaceful elections and prevent outbursts of violence. With regard to the media the idea that 
progressively emerged was that of a harmonious information space, where people could still be allowed to be critical 
and comment negatively on political actors, but could not incur in actions possibly leading to forms of mobilization 
considered harmful by public authorities. The idea of the internet that progressively emerged was not different from the 
one offered by the detailed study of the Chinese internet carried out by King, Pan, and Roberts (2012) [10], which 
showed how it was mostly posts leading to the organization of protests that were removed, rather than those attacking 
the government for misconduct, for example for corruption. And this idea progressively emerged and gained momentum 
without the Chinese government or Chinese companies engaging in any notable activity to support this particular model 
abroad. From the interviews carried out with Ethiopian and Kenyan members of the government, civil servants, but also 
with members of the civil society and private entrepreneurs in 2012 and 2013, none of them referred to Chinese 
authorities as trying to suggest that their model could be productively applied to the Ethiopian and Kenyan cases. 
The conclusions are still highly tentative, but it seems that some of the strategies adopted by the Chinese 
government in China to control and contain the national interned are gaining popularity in both countries, despite no 
attempts form the side of China to promote them abroad. It can be argued that China’s appeal as a prototype has 
increased, without its government necessarily having to engage in activities to persuade its African counterparts. In a 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Margaret Wahito, ‘Kenya: China to Fund Kenya's Fibre Optic Project’ http://allafrica.com/stories/201206290024.html. Last 
accessed 13 July 2013. 
10 See, for example, Okuttah Mark, ‘Safaricom loosens China’s grip on local contracts with Sh14bn tender’ 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Safaricom-loosens-China-grip-on-local-contracts/-/539550/1638364/-/11xotu6z/-/index.html. 
Last accessed 13 July 2013. 
11 See, for example, Lillian Onyango, ‘PS now names blogs over hate messages’ http://mobile.nation.co.ke/News/PS-now-names-blogs-over-hate-
messages/-/1290/1662804/-/format/xhtml/-/hk21w0/-/index.html; Fred Mukinda, ‘Phone firms block 300,000 hate texts daily, says Ndemo’ 
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/News/Phone-firms-block-300-000-hate-texts-daily-says-Ndemo-/-/1290/1726172/-/format/xhtml/-/2e787c/-/index.html; 
Njoroge Kaburo and Peter Mutai, ‘Kenya decries use of social to spread hate speech’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-
03/15/c_132236743.htm Last accessed 13 July 2013.  
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climate where local actors, such as the Ethiopian and the Kenyan government, and in the case of Kenya also the local 
media, private operators, and international organizations, created a political context privileging peace and development 
over allowing a plurality of voices to compete in the marketplace of ideas, China had simply to act as a partner, offering 
unconditional help to governments, to put forward a concept of harmony that it supports. While there was satisfaction 
that the Kenyan elections were conducted peacefully, as peacefully were the elections that took place earlier in Ethiopia 
in 2010, privileging peace also meant downplaying critical voices, such as those of civil society organizations, 
lamenting that grave misconducts and violations of human rights had been marginalized in the name of a peaceful 
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The general purpose of this paper is to problematize the idea of map as a visual representation of a given 
territory. In fact, it is based on the assumption that what we see on a map is the outcome of an exploratory 
process that hides several social dynamics like political power, popular belief or traditions. This research 
is the result of three meetings with a group of mappers of Map Kibera Trust, a no profit organization based 
in Kibera slum. Mapping a particular territory like a slum requires indeed a good understanding of what 
are the steps, roads, secure and insecure places that allow people to easily perform the job. Moving along  
an  informal  settlement  is  quite  complicated  due  to  narrow  streets  interspersed  with  rivers  carrying  
waste  and contaminated water, but also to insecure places, especially as we penetrate into the slum. For 
this reason, all the mappers of the Map Kibera project live, or used to live, in Kibera. 
The implications are significant in understanding the set of social, spatial and human values that connect 
people with their own space, going over the use of an ICT like an open source mapping software. What 
makes possible the realization of the map is not the technological tool itself, but the people who have the 
appropriate tool and use it in their own ground. And speaking about people who map a slum means to 
speak about relations between people themselves and between people and their networks. With this paper, 
there is a desire to find out what are the links between beneficiaries of the project and territory, territory 
and binding agents that led to the creation of the map, work that otherwise could be impossible or not 
leading to the same result. Simultaneously, a reflection about the sustainability of this project will be 
provided, as well as the efficacy and the effective participation in GIS activities like OSM related to the 





This research inquiries into the creation of a participatory maps achieved by the young mappers of a non-profit 
organization based in Kibera: Map Kibera. Before Map Kibera’s work, the slum was a black spot on the map and this 
mapping project was initiated in response to the lack of available public and open map data of the zone. The general 
idea is that behind the creation of a map, in the particular locations like the informal settlements, what allow to work 
and to create a map is the power of the human and social networks. This hypothesis was confirmed by following and 
observing the mapping processes of this group, conducting interviews and focus groups that gave me the instrument to 
analyze the concept of participatory mapping in a slum. 
With my research I intend to make a contribution to the broader theme of ICT4D, reflecting on how the use of a 
technology increasingly underpins a series of links and social values that go well beyond the technological innovation 
itself. 
Before to analyze the fieldwork, I need to define the framework that allowed me to place the facts I have observed 
on the ground. The analysis of the  mapping process  of Map  Kibera can fit  with the  Actor-Network Theory (ANT), 
that focuses on the mechanisms of power and the concept of knowledge as they emerge from the interactions between 
human beings and artifacts [1]. Power is intended as the product of the interactions among elements of heterogeneous 
networks. Heterogeneous is the key term that drew my attention as it refers to the participation of different materials: 
human and no-human, people and machine. In ANT, there is no point in differentiating between the elements of a 
network because the relevance rests on the relations among the actors rather than in their nature. ANT is a theoretical 
approach that help re-conceptualize many  of the  issues  behind the  dilemmas of development theories  and  practices,  
highlighting  “how people’s  actions and  interactions are part of what stabilizes objects, processes, texts, and ideas to 
become things” [2]. ANT scholars claim that this theoretical perspective is particularly useful to analyze “situations 
where interactions of the social, technological and political are regarded as particularly important” [3]. 
Thanks to this theory, it is possible to overcome the distinction human/machine and thus consider social and 
technical networks as a continuum, bridging the networks of institutions, organizations and individuals which constitute 
Kibera’s civil society and the technical networks revolving around participatory mapping processes. The actors 
implicated in development projects like citizens, community based organization (CBOs), local and international NGOs 
and institutions are powerful and affect the success of the same actions. However, even among the development    
professionals who act participatory approaches continue to face problems and this raises important challenges  
concerning  the  role  that  an  actor  holds  in  its community, obfuscating sometime the voice of marginalized groups 
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and the weak they are meant to serve [4].  
What is behind a map built in a slum? What are the relationships between locals? What kind of influence the 
stakeholders have in Kibera community and its activities? I argue that what makes possible the creation of a map in a 
place like an informal settlement is the connection between the mappers and the social agents, redefining the bonds of 
power that affect the social activity in the community of Kibera. 
 
 
THE PARTICIPATORY AND OPEN SOURCE MAPPING SOFTWARE: OPEN STREET MAP 
 
Map Kibera was launched in response to the lack of available map data and other public, open, and shared 
information about Kibera, the second largest slum in Africa. Its mission is to increase the potential impact of the map 
data, making the final products available for the entire Kibera and Kenya community. 
For the creation of the maps was chosen an open source GPS, Open Street Map, that allowed them to begin to focus 
on the mapping process in more detail in four areas, health, security, education, and, thanks to an UNICEF  partnership, 
to undertake an issue-based mapping with a focus on mapping girls’ security [5]. 
Created by Steve Coast in the UK in 2004, OSM  was inspired by the success of Wikipedia and preponderance of 
proprietary map data in the UK and elsewhere [6] and provides free geographic data such as street maps to anyone who 
wants them, inviting people to view, contribute and use the map in collaborative and creative ways. 
As Yu-ei Lin says:  
 
“whereas  the  complexities  of  the  world have long been simplified and reduced to a known 
geometric scale in their maps by professional cartographers, the advent of OpenStreetMap has 
transparentised and democratized cartography; non- cartographers are now provided with an 
opportunity   to   participate   in   the   map-making process”. [7] 
 
Fig. 1 - Map Kibera’s map created by using Open Street Map. 
 
 
Participatory GIS is, therefore, an attempt to utilize GIS technology in the context of the needs and capabilities of 
communities that will be involved with development  program  in  the production of GIS data and spatial decision  
making,  involving  local people by integrating participatory mapping information, capturing local knowledge and 
combining it with more traditional spatial information. [8] 
 
 
KIBERA: THE LARGEST INFORMAL SETTLEMENT OF NAIROBI 
 
Kibera is the second Africa’s largest, densest and poorest slum (the first is Soweto, South Africa) and  the 
population depends on the source (one other estimation varies from 235,000 to a maximum of 270,000 people [9]) and 
on the period of the year. [10] 
The exact number of people who live in this settlement was never been discovered, due to the constant 
displacement of people and the indifference of the government to a place considered informal. 
Kibera is located at 7 km from the center of Nairobi and is at the core of the Kibra constituency. It extends on 256 
hectares, with a population density of more than 2,000 people per hectare [11], and it is bisected by the railway to 
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Uganda. According to the figures available, only 17% of the adult population is permanently employed [12]; the rest are 
casual workers and migrants, mainly employed in Nairobi’s industrial area. The official definition for Kibera is 
‘informal settlement’, although the area has been occupied since 1912. 
Nowadays, it is formed by 14 villages, mainly divided along ethnic lines. Almost all Kenyan tribes are represented 
in Kibera but Luos are the main ethnic group. The topography undulates with two heavily polluted streams running 
through the settlement and forming corresponding valleys; the railway line along its northern perimeter, the abandoned 
dam to its southern edge and infrastructure on its eastern side further add differentiating parameters to the fabric of a 
highly complex settlement. 
The entire territory of Kibera is government property and, by a complicated set economic, political and social 
factors, who hold a right to occupation of the land often lack economic resources, generating interests of a circulation of 
capital linked to numerous rented properties. 
Humanitarian NGOs are often one of the very few actors operating in these conditions of disadvantaged and, 
despite the lack of almost all public services, Kibera is a big recipient of international aid. Every international agency 
funds initiatives and projects in the slum, starting with UN-Habitat, the United Nations’ body for human settlements, 
which is located, ironically enough, few kilometers away from one of biggest informal settlement in the  world. There 
are an estimate 100 NGOs and over 400 Community based organizations (CBO’s) in  the slum, engaged in wide range 
of activities such as providing HIV information and advocacy, empowering groups of women and training kids and 
teenagers. These CBO’s include also self-help groups, mainly women organizations which keep a fund and loan small 





Before the organization’s idea, a research project led by an Italian researcher, Stefano Marras, was called with the 
same name, but the projects are two different entities, also if their intentions are really similar. 
‘Map Kibera project’ was launched in May 2008 and was aimed to take a census of the structures, 
infrastructures and population of the entire shantytown, but the pilot project has focused just on the village of 
Kianda, situated on the northwestern end of the slum. [13] 
‘Map Kibera’ was a project of GroundTruth Initiative and started in October 2009 with a small grant from 
Jumpstart International, a non-governmental organization specializing in community-based mapping, and the grant was 
meant to facilitate the creation of the first public, digital map of Kibera, through the training of the local youth in the 
use of GPS and open source GIS tools. 
In November 2009, local young people motivated to work for Kibera community learned to create maps using 
OpenStreetMap techniques. Kibera was not actually unmapped but the problem was that none of the existing maps were 
shared with the public or used by Kibera’s residents [14]. So, thanks to the Nairobi tech scene and some American start 
up help, the young Kibera volunteers created a group of mapper included surveying with GPS, digitization of satellite 
imagery and paper based annotation with Walking Papers. Map Kibera Trust is a project of Erica Hagen and Mikel 
Maron and the current executive director is Kepha Ngito. They worked in partnership with local and international 
organizations like Social Development Network (SODNET), Carolina for Kibera, an international NGO based in  
Kibera that seeks to promote leadership, women’s empowerment and community development, and the Kibera 
Community Development Agenda (KCODA), a community media organization that publishes the Kibera Journal, the 
only local newspaper. 
In 2010 Map Kibera became a Trust and  the  founders established two additional projects aiming to create an  
interactive community information platform. The first was Voice of Kibera (Vok), an SMS reporting project that uses 
the Ushahidi platform to enable residents to text in reports on events happening in Kibera. The reports are approved by 
an editorial al team and integrated on the website with the digital map of Kibera. The second project that was introduced 
in this period was the Kibera News Network (KNN), a video journalism initiative where videographers create short 
documentaries and news stories about Kibera that are published on their YouTube channel. 
Ushahidi is a non-profit software company that develops free and open-source software for information collection, 
visualization, and interactive mapping. Ushahidi (Swahili for "testimony" or "witness") was created in the aftermath of 
Kenya's disputed 2007 presidential elections to collect reports of violence reported by email and text message, placing 
them on a map. 
The platform is built to collect information from the general public and citizen about events happening in near real-
time. It is also, assisting areas that are not well covered in the mainstream media; for this reason it has been named 
crowdmap. The main concept of the crowdmap is crowdsourcing for social activism and public accountability, 
empowering  citizen journalism activities in different part of the world. [15] 
The reports can be submitted by using a mobile phones or internet and many countries from all over the world have 
benefit of the Ushahidi crowdmap for several emergency projects: Russian bloggers to co-ordinate a relief effort, Haiti 
to identify natural disaster locations and others in Chile, Pakistan, Congo, Philippines, Peru etc.. [16] 
In 2013 Map Kibera Trust is integrating the use of different ICTs and tools to improve his work and to better 
interact with the slum communities, as the monitoring election project during the March presidential elections or a 
current project concerning accountability and transparency of community funds. 
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Map Kibera Trust works for the community and with the community, thanks to a participative approach used by the 





Mapping a particular territory like a slum requires a good understanding of what are the steps, roads, secure and 
insecure places that allow people to easily perform the job. The implications are significant in understanding the set of 
social, spatial and human values that connect the mappers with their own space, going over the use of an ICT like 
mapping software. The methodology and approach used in this research are focus groups and interviews, carried out to 
discuss and identify those elements that led to the creation of the map using an open source technology. With this 
research, there is a desire to find out what are the links between people, territory and binding agents that led to the 
creation of the map, work that otherwise could be impossible or not leading to the same result. 
According to Erica Hagen, in the implementation of the project: 
 
“Equally important was the fact that the mapping experience validated the knowledge that 
participants already held: their intimate knowledge of the paths, businesses, and social relations 
of their own neighborhood. Now they were regarded as holders of important information rather 
than poorly educated slum dwellers”. [18] 
 
As I explained in the introduction, the framework that supports my analysis is the conception of the social relations 
power and the role of the local actors in influencing development projects in a territory. In this case, the development 
program is a participatory mapping project and the actors are those groups and community leaders identified by the 
mapper team during the meetings and interviews. The focus groups were divided in three parts and were aimed to: 
 
- Get the general understanding of the mapping process in a slum 
- Know the implication of the mapping process in to the community and discover the background of the mappers 
- Draft a map of the slum to underline the networks and relationship between them and the slum spots 
 
First meeting with the mappers 
 
The main purpose of this meeting was to get the general understanding of the mapping  process.  
There were submitted some general questions about the  mapping phases and the interaction between the mappers 
and the community stakeholders, but the conversation was really free and  people easily interacted and exchanged 
opinions. By analyzing observations and notes, I identified eight processes. 
The main question was: “how do the mapping process works?” 
 
1. Finding the point of interests for the entire community 
First, they start to identify and understand the needs of the people living in a particular area of the slum and the final 
choice depends on several aspects that I deepen later. 
 
2. Getting in touch with the community stakeholders 
Secondly, after they have decided the point of interests, the mappers try to contact the community stakeholders using 
their personal contacts. 
 
Then, they meet the stakeholders to discuss about their findings to proceed later to work with the stakeholders 
belonging to the matter they are considering. They need to meet stakeholders to get the permission to map a particular 
area, to take picture, to collect information from them and to share ideas about the needs of that place. 
 
But my question was: “who are the stakeholders?” They really mention those actors but it was not clear who they 
are and what they do in Kibera community. During the meetings, we were able to identify a number of actors in Kibera, 
including: 
 
- local administrators 
- opinion leaders 
- village elders 
- service providers (the professional in different fields like water, education –like teachers, garbage etc.…) 
- religious institutions 
 
Another goal of this focus group was to understand how the mappers get in touch with those stakeholders and they 
explained that it depends on the type of actor with whom they were dealing with. 
If they want to interact with some public administration people, they just walk to the offices to explain the mapping 
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project, in order to get the permission to work and ask the institutions to provide the mappers security. With the other 
stakeholders, they use the mobile phones to contact them and to arrange a meeting.  
The mobile phone is the most used technology between the organizations in Kibera. Many time internet connection 
does not work and most of these groups do not have a website or a social platform so that the mobile device becomes 
essential. 
 
3. Organizing general stakeholder meetings 
After the previous stage, they arrange meetings involving different stakeholders of the area they want to map to reflect 
and to compare the people needs. Sometime both the mappers and the local actor require several meetings before to 
agree about the problems concerning the mapping process. 
 
4. Participatory mapping: involving the community in the process 
During the meetings with stakeholders they look for some volunteer from the area they want to map, sharing their ideas 
and analysis with the  Kibera actors and  engaging young people with a  strong motivation to  learn and  to  support 
community development. Further, they select just people from the zone they want to map and people who know well 
the place and the number of people they involve depend on how the area is big. Then, after they have nominated a 
volunteer’s coordinator, the mappers train the volunteer team, giving them technical skills to map. 
 
5. Editing data in the office 
In this step, the mapping team try to find out what kind of data they want to collect brainstorming together, creating a 
“data collection form”, that is a paper to submit to the organization/CBOs/institutions to collect information about them. 
They speak about logistic issues like the money they need to buy lunch, airtime, printing, gum boot etc…Then, they 
check if every device is working well: GPS, software and internet connection. 
 
6. The practical work: to the field 
Once they have spoken with stakeholders and people from the slum they go to the field with GPS, notebook, cameras 
and the “data collection form”, in order to register every structure they map and the people who work in these places. 
After being asked how long it takes to map an area they answer that it depends on how depth and specific should be 
their job and the size of the area to be mapped. 
If the mappers did not have the questionnaire and the camera, it can take just three weeks, like the time they spent to 
map their first Kibera general map. When they started to use the questionnaire and the camera to take pictures of the 
place and create thematic maps, they spent three months to complete their work. 
So, the time they take to map an area depends on the size of the area and on the tools that they want to use during the 
mapping process (if they take pictures or not, if they bring the questionnaire – the “data collection form”- or not). 
 
7. The sharing process: sharing the results with the community 
They organize a Community Forum, where they compare their work with the community opinions changing, if 
necessary, the map structure. Maybe they forget to map something and the stakeholder give them new inputs to add into 
the map . After that, the final map can be printed and distributed among the  institutions, NGOs and CBOs offices and 
around the stakeholders like schools, churches and youth centers. 
 
8. Using the maps for a common interest 
According with our interviews and visits to the CBOs and Kibera organizations places, most of them have the map 
hanging on their office wall and they say that they use the map to locate and recognize other points of interest, 
otherwise impossible without a map. Further, the map undertake the role of identification with the community and 
therefore with the slum itself. As the mapper coordinator, Millicent, says, “is also a special way for the community and 
the people who visit the office to locate their house and their workplace into the map. They feel happy and excited”. 
 
Mapping a particular place like a slum with an high number of difficulties involves some challenges for the people 
who ride through the narrow streets of the shantytown, like Map Kibera mappers. By asking them “What kind of 
challenges you face in doing your job?”, they identified two main areas where they sometime encounter a problem. 
 
In the field 
The mappers admitted that, at the beginning of their activity, many people did not trust them, especially in the 
health sector, where the employees that should have a specialization to work, did not have it; “they see the mappers like 
a spy”, a mapper says. One other challenge is that in some not really safe areas they have to hide the GPS while they 
work, also if they can recognize “tricky people, thief or dangerous situations”, one other mapper says, “and to map 
Kibera we have to be from Kibera”. 
 
In using the equipment 
Occasionally there are problems related to the weather conditions that can impede the mapper to bring the GPS to 
the field and sometime, in narrow and covered passages , can lacks the connection between the GPS and the satellite. 
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Second meeting with the mappers 
 
The second meeting was aimed to focus on 
the mapper background and relationship with 
Kibera community and institutions. To learn more 
about those connections, I gave them a notebook 
for each and a pen and explained the exercise. 
They were told to write down every important 
connection they have in the slum  as a community 
person and as a Map Kibera mappers. For 
example, the typology of  link of a person living 
in a given territory (like the church environment, 
village  elders,  water  vendors etc…)  could  be  
different  from  the personal links and contacts 
achieved in the work field. This meeting was used 
to collect data for the next stage and to make the 
mapper understand about the importance of their 
network in the slum area, a net of relationship 
that allows them to perform their job. 
 
Fig. 2 - Map Kibera political map hanging on 
Langata District Peace Committee wall in Kibera. 
 
 
Third meeting with the mappers 
 
The final meeting was the last step of 
our focus groups and included the principal 
activity: the construction of a social relations  
map.  First,  they  were  told  to copy what 
they previously wrote in the notebook in 
some stickers, divided for the two categories 
of social relations: people, stakeholders and  
institutions they know as a citizen of a slum 
and as a mapper. Then, the post-it were 
hanged on the wall and discussed all 
together, identifying the sectors and 
categories of stakeholders from a collective 
analysis. 
 
Fig. 3 - A mapper hanging their social 
relationship stickers on the wall. 
 
The categories found – each one 
identified with a different colour - were six 
and reproduced both the personal and 
professional  relationships  that  the mappers 
have in Kibera slum: 
 
-      church 
-      CBOs 
-      NGOs 
-      school 
-      administrations 






Fig. 4 - Some actor categories identified 
during the meeting. 




Using  the  same  colors  the  participants 
drew a map on a transparent sheet, 
tracing the profile of the Map Kibera 
paper map and allocating in the same 
map, one by one, structures and places 
forming part of the categories identified 










Fig. 5 - The mappers drawing their 
personal relationships on Kibera map. 
 
The final result is a map of social 
networks and personal relationships in the 
slum community, from the school to the 
health center, from the administrative 
institutions to the no profit organizations 










Fig. 6 - The final map representing the 






Having a perfect knowledge of the zone to map is a necessary prerequisite for every person who want to do this job 
in Kibera and, I guess, in every informal settlement of the world. A key aspect of this case study is that all mappers who 
have mapped Kibera live, or used to live, in Kibera, revealing how being a resident of the slum was a basic prerequisite 
in facilitating the mapping process. In Map Kibera case behind the use of the ICTs and technology, there are a range of 
relationships between people, places, workplaces and institutions that are fundamental to maintaining confidence among 
the community and implement participatory mapping activities. Churches, CBOs, NGOs, schools, administrations and 
health facilities are the finding results of a learning process that allowed the realizations of these three meetings, 
reconstructing together what are the key steps of their mapping processes and the typology of relationship they have in 
Kibera community. Doing so, it has been possible to understand the main characters that represent the most influencing 
actors for Kibera citizens, denoting how there is a hidden power that affect social relations and also projects or actions 
involving the whole community of the slum. 
This paper is the result of three days focus groups and the short time spent did not allow me to get to the bottom of 
many other important issues and in-depth analysis. My work aims to provide food for thought for a wider research that 
addresses the social role and power of certain realities inside the slum of Kibera and in any existing informal settlement. 
Who are the most influential stakeholders in the slums? What tribe and which political party they belong to? What 
relationships have with other local actors and with the same slum community? 
Moreover, the representation of space is always a sensitive issue because of the different perceptions that a 
population can have of its own territory, which may not coincide with what should be circumscribed by a system of 
PGIS [19]. 
Is the knowledge of indigenous constructed through a “Western way” to do cartography and participatory mapping 
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processes or can a system like OSM be regarded as a suitable means of self-representation? The use of GPS in 
developing countries and, in this case, in a slum, is often externally driven and technocrats, despite seeking to make 
these technologies more and more inclusive, leave some outstanding issues that sometimes do not allow projects to get a 
positive result. As Rambaldi et. Al. argue, some important questions that should be addressed are: 
 
“Who’s GIS is it? Whose questions are addressed? Who’s set the agenda? What will happen when 
experts leave or when donor funding dries up? What is left with those who generated the data an 
shared their knowledge?”. [20] 
 
In order to make an ICT4D project succeed and pass to what Heek called ICT4D 2.0 [21] phase, a participation of 
beneficiaries in the design and construction phase of the project is required, as well as a construction of skills and 
capacity at the local and institutional level and a continuous learning phase. Despite Map Kibera activities have been led 
with a bottom up approach and the maps produced have been used by many Kibera organizations and seen as reference 
point for the slum inhabitants, mapping activities are concluded because of lack of funds and its efficacy and 
sustainability is compromised. 
Furthermore the current availability of spatial data and the large choice of open source software and user interfaces 
could increase the gap between those who have the ability to access these tools and who is excluded, especially in a 
fragmented environment like that of Nairobi, where town and slums are two independent and non-communicating 
entities living in the same space. 
These and other questions can be the beginning of a new research and reflection on the social dynamics embedded 
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Citizens are now able to produce cultural localized knowledge; ICT technologies can integrate data-
sharing platforms into the spatial dynamics of cities. This can promote a sustainable enhancement of local 
communities through cooperative activities setting culture as growth-driver. The M.U.S.I.C. 
(Mediterranean Urban Sounds Interactive Culture) project promoted by the University of Tunis and 
Politecnico di Milano-DAStU (International Cooperation Lab and Measures and Scales of the 
Contemporary City Lab) aims at reinforcing the awareness of a shared regional culture in the Southern 
Mediterranean Region. The project gives structure to the relation among digital media as catalyst tools and 
urban regeneration as spatial rooting device, setting an innovative exportable cooperative strategy. The 
action plan applies sounds analysis to geo-localized user-generated content to extract patterns of 
perception of urban and rural spaces. A visualization platform archives and diffuses these data, working 
for synergies between formal and informal economies. The project helps to improve the responsiveness of 
urban systems to the cultural requests of citizens and customers. It reinforces the need of new professional 
figures and more structured relations among them. The digital platform, as engine of spatial regeneration 
for built heritage, fosters economies of scale determining a spatial rooting in specific urban or rural spaces 
suitable to host permanent or temporary, profitable or non-profit activities. The gathering of actors around 
specific nodes will transform them in Mediterranean antennas transmitting the sound of places for a 
cultural and economical exchange among people and countries. The economical balance is reached 
through an equilibrated management of profit and no-profit initiatives setting relations among 
stakeholders at various scales. A cultural sustainability framework could make the music industry able to 
sustain local emerging realities and to promote education. 
 
 
M.U.S.I.C. (Mediterranean Urban Sounds Interactive Culture) is a project promoted by the University of Tunis and 
Politecnico di Milano-DAStU (International Cooperation Lab and Measures and Scales of the Contemporary City Lab) 
with the aim of reinforcing the awareness of a shared regional culture in the Southern Mediterranean Region. In the 
South Mediterranean countries the national analysis allowed us to identify some specific problems valuable at Regional 
level in the field of cultural economies: lack of structures offered by institutions and city administrations for cultural 
activities; lack of interest by the investors to enhance cultural spaces and activities; insufficient awareness of the value 
of local heritage; difficult relationship between the cultural institutions and single artists; people and local communities 
are not involved in documenting living heritage; the documentation of cultural heritage (tangible and intangible) is not 
spread by social network and new media; the relationship between tangible and intangible heritage is not well 
developed. The aim of the project is to contribute to solve these problems stimulating the local population to keep a 
direct role in finding right solutions and supporting the local and national authorities to improve their support to the 
creative and cultural field. In each country the situation is very different and in this framework all the actions 
implemented by the EU, Unesco, World bank give a real contribution to move different southern countries towards 
similar solutions. The international crisis and the specific situation of many Arab countries push the Governments to 
other directions considering culture as a privilege for few people. What is relevant is that the civil society growing its 
capacity to address the political decision and young generation are very interested in saving their heritage, in sharing 
their culture, and in creating job opportunities in their own country. The project will not refer to some specific 
governmental plan but it is strongly linked with a social plan produced every day by the civil society. The role of the 
Universities is fundamental to involve the students as well the intellectual people in this process. The M.U.S.I.C. project 
is an instrument to improve the application of two Unesco Conventions: the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005) and the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (2003). The project is also linked to the “Medina 2030” programme implemented by  FEMIP, Unesco 
and Arab Town Organization and with the following projects: Athena (Euromed heritage IV) closed in 2012 and lead 
by the Department of Antiquities of Jordan. It concerns the Ancient Theatres in the Mediterranean and proposed 
innovative methodologies to produce management plan for the theatres and their clusters involving local communities; 
DOREMIHE (Enpi Italie – Tunisie), actually under negotiation, a project to create a common doctorate in the field of 
cultural heritage with the University of Palermo. Another link could be created with the Unesco Chair (Intangible 
Heritage) managed by Evora University and already involving Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt Palestine and Italy.  
M.U.S.I.C. MEDITERRANNEAN URBAN SOUNDS INTERACTIVE CULTURE 
822 
 
WEB 2.0 OPPORTUNITIES AND INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGES 
 
The background of the project is the growing production and availability of cultural information with geo-
references, generated by non professional web users and supported by technologies generally known as Web 2.0 [1][2]. 
Citizens are now capable to produce cultural localized knowledge and to contribute through local engagement and by 
the use of new, widely diffused technologies such as mobile phones [3] to sensing and monitoring aspects of the urban 
environment. Hence, ICT technologies can be deployed to integrate data-sharing platforms into the spatial dynamics of 
the city. As Mitchell noted, the spaces and places of twenty-first century cities provide contexts for communication 
serving not only to shelter and protect their inhabitants, but also to ground and sustain meaningful interaction among 
them, and to construct community. Emerging critical practices have proposed new models to describe the city that stress 
the collaborative, constructionist dynamics of the mapping processes. The underlying idea of this approach considers 
the geographic, urban experience through a network of multiple, fragmented and temporary data and information 
generated by human-place interactions and collaborative dynamics. Based on these theoretical premises, several 
experimental GIS focusing on cartography emerging from users’ perceptions and activities have been produced. As 
Zook and Graham noticed [4], traditional methods used to register users’ perceptions and activities about the cities and 
its fruition - like surveys and ethnographic reports - seem to be inadequate to meet the need of information of 
contemporary society both because they require a considerable amount of resources (in terms of time and money) and 
because they do not consider the temporal dimension. 
Web 2.0 applications, the growth of online mapping tools and the development of networks of “sensors” capable of 
recording and geo-reference a variety of signals can transform human beings in potential “sensors” that not only have 
the intellectual ability to process and interpret what they "feel"  but also to geo-localise the information (sometimes 
involuntarily) and spread it globally through the Internet. The combination of these factors produce and disseminate an 
immense amount of geographical information which can be: voluntary/conscious and involuntary/unconscious. The first 
type stems from web mapping activities, while the second type is generated by digital footprints left by web users in the 
cyberspace without being aware they are producing geographic information. 
This user generated information, termed Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI; a controversial definition), 
differs from conventionally produced geographic information in several aspects: the source of the information, the 
technologies for acquiring it, the methods and techniques for working with it and the social processes that mediate its 
creation and impact. Traditionally geographic information has been produced by experts and institutions: so certain 
types of information have been privileged and other types ignored or marginalized [5]. VGI represents a powerful shift 
in sources, content, characteristics, modes of data production, mining, sharing, dissemination and use. This approach 
could support transfer of knowledge, exchange of expertise and best practices among cultural actors, support the 
structuring and strengthening of professional cultural associations and networks. 
Can geo-tagged and user generated content be useful in the creation of meaningful, real time indicators of urban 
quality related to the cultural heritage? Is it possible to plot the very many and co-existing perceptions in cities and 
neighbourhoods, relying on User Generated Content? What kind of GIS-based spatial analysis techniques can be 
applied to geodata to produce real-time maps of citizens’ cultural perceptions, sentiments and emotions related to them? 
How does an urban semantic layer - the meanings we attach to places - look like? How can this data be validated, in 
order to verify if they are significant and accurate proxies of common perceptions toward city spaces? How can user-
generated information be applied to the design, implementation and evaluation of urban policies and spatial design and 
planning related to the cultural heritage? How can well-being and happiness related to the cultural issues be defined and 
observed from user generated content? And what use can we make of ubiquitously connected things and sensor data of 
various kinds towards the aims of the stakeholders? And how can we design such infrastructures to support human 
communication and cultural meaning-making? 
Besides UGCs that are explicitly spatial and can be easily geo-localized, as long as they are made available through 
on-line mapping platforms, produced through GPS-integrated (mobile) devices, are geo-tagged or can be geo-referenced 
by using IP addresses, there is an enormous amount of web content that is merely textual and that is not possible to 
geolocalize directly. Moreover, the recognition of the geographical origin of contents, does not guarantee that they are 
actually referring to the places where they are produced, nor that they include information which is relevant for the 
purpose of the project. In order to overcome those limitations and to extract relevant and appropriate information, it’s 
possible to apply entity recognition (NER) methods to assign geographical scopes, through automatic GeoReferencing, 
including GeoParsing (or GeoExtraction) and GeoCoding processes.  Analysing geo-localized contents to explore 
emotional indicators and topics will result in a number of dynamic maps on perceived urban quality, using visual 
representation to enhance the detection of patterns, reducing the search for information and enabling perceptual 
inference operations. That fact produces huge audiences for cultural productions at local and regional levels and 
increases and represents a stronger incentive for possible investors. 
M.U.S.I.C. focuses on the possibility to constantly extract quantitative and qualitative indications on how places 
and cities are perceived by inhabitants and city users. End users would be able to count on information which is relevant 
for their cultural purposes. The project aims at reinforcing the awareness of a shared regional culture and setting 
synergies between formal and informal cultural dynamics. This can be envisioned giving structure to the relation among 
digital media as catalyst tools and urban regeneration as spatial rooting device.  M.U.S.I.C. aims at providing multi-
dimensional and vivid experiences of physical space throughout the music and sound related to different times of city 
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inhabitants, tourists and visitors as well as a sophisticated and specialized data base for experts. Within this framework, 
the project aims at providing a wide range of stakeholders (which includes urban managers and public administrations 
as well as citizens) with meaningful cultural inquiry information about the city environment they live or work in. 
Starting from the historical physical manufacture and passing through instruments and sounds, the project focuses on 
the contextualization of cultural heritages within the so called “Intelligent Expert System of Digitalization”. So that, 
after a data mining through independent and flexible media, it will be possible to know if some archives already exist, 
or to create them. Through natural language and network analyses, the project will identify a cultural behavioural and 
semantic background for the entire city, related to the sound, rhythms, music of a place, making it possible to extract 
and depict specific patterns of subjective perception and use. This will allow the cultural economical energetic 
sustainability of the conservation through a project related with the music as a propeller for a cultural awareness. 
 
 
FOSTERING CULTURAL AWARENESS TO ENHANCE CULTURAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIES 
 
The project will develop a strategy to archive cultural data, - sounds music and rhythms in particular - extracted 
from different sources, such as independent social networks, web platforms, mainstream media, specific information by 
population, which will be delivered to Public Administrations involved, to implement through these a cultural 
awareness. The envisioned action plan applies sounds and places analysis to spatial and geo-localized user-generated 
content in order to extract patterns of perception of city and rural spaces. With the project’s focus on the operational 
level of the city the aim is to constantly extract indications on city cultural uses related to the sound of places. In 
particular the project platform will allow end-users to analyze users’ perceptions related to specific geographic areas, 
detect the lack of structures related to the culture offered by institutions and city administrations, discover possible 
emergent structures and bottom-up initiatives responding to uncovered needs and desire, discover meaningful 
relationships and connections between places, people and cultural uses. The data display and diffusion will be provided 
through a visualization engine, helpful to understand how the cultural heritage is perceived within a city and how it can 
be managed. The visualization engine, will provide both geographic and non-geographic features. 
Geographic visualizations will be the main access point to information, showing the intensities and qualities of the 
captured data under the form of graphical layers which are stackable onto the map, allowing for comparative 
visualizations across times, information sources, themes and other parameters. Maps will be completely navigable and 
filterable, allowing Municipalities to visualize only the information they want to focus on, including the other data 
sources which will be provided in the platform, as gathered from databases coming from institutional, verified sources. 
The non-geographical visualizations will show classical statistical and analytical information about the data contained 
in the system and its subsets, including distributions, correlations, indexes and dissemination across time and subjects. 
Specific visualizations will provide insights on the interpretation of the harvested information, expressing it under the 
form of semantic graphs directly obtained by the processes which will use semantic classification techniques. From this 
set of visualizations users will be able to focus on specific subsets of data, and then visualize them geographically. All 
data and visualizations will be exportable using internationally recognized open formats, allowing for easy integration 
to other databases and documentation forms. 
The project will also develop meaningful ways to represent spatial cultural heritage and sounds for an immediate 
reading, understanding and interpretation of the information to convey and to archive. Many practices rely on the act of 
‘mapping’ the world in order to make decisions; in the case of Urban Design, mapping is an integral part of the design 
process. Maps are used to support and argue for specific design and development decisions even though they are often 
built from limited sources of data or even from the perspective of a single person (thereby greatly increasing the 
subjectivity of the artefact). 
Geo-spatial data (the visualization of real-time feeds of data on maps), with regard to the resulting cultural heritage 
indicators and sounds, will be a central point: particular effort will be put in developing an effective representation and 
sound system, that will allow the user flexibility and the possibility to highlight data related to specific issues, with the 
aim of providing an easy to use tool for designers, cultural operators and decision makers. Unlike traditional maps, 
which are often static representations of distributed phenomena at a given moment in time, M.U.S.I.C. will provide 
tools for grasping the moving picture of citizens expressions, as they are constantly changing and evolving with the city 
itself. The result will be a map/archive of the geo localized territory sounds and cultural places. 
Building a notion of time into computer-generated maps would definitely help urban planners, cultural operators 
and designers to present a more dynamic notion of what places and experiences in cities are and are fundamental to 
create an awareness of cultural identity. The graphic user interface will be specifically designed to meet final users' 
needs, and specifically to make complex data effectively accessible, easily searchable in a visual and “hearable” way, 
through a visual  and sound language that will allow the users to intuitively catch a temporal understanding of people, 
places and sounds in the city. 
The tool we wish to develop would help the whole range of cultural operators, stakeholders involved in decision-
making processes that result in planning activities, in urban design, in the definition of urban policies related to the 
cultural heritage. It would be a monitoring tool, offering information interpreted and mapped in real- time to the cultural 
elements of the city and its citizens, deploying de facto a cybernetic feedback loop between them. It would be helpful in 
understanding how the cultural heritage is perceived within a city, but it could also give hints to central and local public 
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administrations who are willing to adopt a more human-centred approach toward our cities’ transformations. 
The awareness of the presence of renovated cultural opportunities related to the sound and music in the 
Mediterranean area, will reinforce the need of new professional figures as cultural private and public administrators, 
curators, and producers. Festivals and informal performing occasions in the north Africa context do not produce durable 
skills for cultural operators neither for Arab artists mobility. The relations between cultural operators, decision makers 
and citizens have to be enhanced in a more structured way. Only acting constantly, cultural operators will better 
influence their political, administrative and economic environment. The project platform will work as a catalyst in 
setting synergies between formal and informal cultural economies. Under a regional management setting the general 
framework, local stakeholders and cultural associations will operate as curators able to coordinate activities at the local 
and inter-regional scale of the network and to work on the formal-informal interactions. The possibility of finding 
meaningful ways to inquire citizens' patterns of use, cultural spatial experiences and related perceptions of the urban 
environment brings in fact many important promises to the fields of urban design, planning and management. 
 
 
MAPPING SOUNDS, SPATIAL ROOTING AND URBAN REGENERATION 
 
In every city, there are areas with strong character and identity. It’s clear to everyone where and what a historical 
centre is, how to define an urban park or a hilly countryside. But how can we define and how people name areas in 
transition? For example the terrain vague of areas that used to be rural, areas of suburban fragmentation, areas 
characterized by enclosed technological infrastructures that often disappear from the mental representations the 
inhabitants build to navigate and communicate their environment. We think that sounds identify cultural places 
historical and not, which can define the identity of a place. 
A domain where VGI (Volunteer Geographic Information) has been demonstrated to have considerable potential is 
in the identification and description of so-called vernacular place names – that is to say the often unofficial place names 
that people use in their everyday life, whose borders do not coincide with administrative regions. For example, Jones et 
al. (2008) investigated the use of web mining to identify place names associated with vernacular names and thus derive 
a “shared” idea of the definition of large vernacular regions such as Switzerland’s Mittelland or the Midlands in the UK. 
Hollenstein and Purves explored how place names were used in Flickr, in particular with respect to the naming of city 
centre neighbourhoods. Edwardes and Purves [6] looked at the use of so-called basic levels, that is to say terms 
commonly used to describe place, in Geograph, a large collection of volunteered georeferenced images, and 
demonstrated that similar results could not be obtained from previous empirical studies, thus demonstrating that VGI 
has the potential to be used as an alternative means of gaining knowledge of shared concepts of space. We think that 
sound rhythms and music of a place could be a red line to define a new trans national space along the Mediterranean 
area. 
Is it possible that cultural heritage makes people talk about an area? How many different cultural activities make 
people talk about an area? Is the sound theme possible in a district? How do cultural heritage awareness change over 
time (on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly base)? What are the public’s perception of a few central elements often 
associated with “good” cultural environment and thus increasing the liveability of a city: how accountable is its 
government (fiscally as well as in transparency); what is its accountability to the public in terms of this perceived 
performance which presume citizen interest. Thus different components of “access” and participation are key in 
stimulating both the elicited perceptions of liveability as well as prioritization of citizens in order to better target and 
special design and policy related to cultural issues and sounds, which satisfies their criteria for a “liveable” city. This 
could be done with an initial scoping or “digital emersion” phase where the research team identifies the appropriate 
mechanisms, places and ways to build relationships based on their sounds mapped, through networks of social hubs and 
focal points where further participation could be elicited. The these links should be traced in order to see where a social 
change agent (or blocker) has been identified through an expression of values of what liveability in certain geographic 
areas means and what is needed as expressed by the inhabitants within the community, as issues, alternatives, and their 
position on the current status of the liveability. 
Through the application of sentiment analysis techniques, a method first developed for businesses aiming to market 
their products, within the textual analysis of UGC, it will be possible to identify generic sentiments from citizens toward 
cities, specific neighbourhoods within cities or single urban infrastructures, landscape and urban projects. Sentiment 
analysis will allow to extract information about, on the one hand, users’ judgement and evaluation, classified according 
to their polarity (positive, negative, or neutral) and, on the other hand, about the affective/emotional state of the writing 
author, e.g. happiness, fear, etc. While there is extensive research about sentiment analysis per se, and a growing interest 
for applying sentiment analysis to UGC and social networks (see Golder S.A. et al. in Science 333, 2011), the 
application of sentiment analysis to spatial and environment  data has not been experimented yet. The integration of 
sentiment analysis, UGC, and spatial analysis techniques, can provide relevant information about urban perceptions and 
emotions through space, that would be otherwise impossible to obtain, to map and to visualize. 
The Project platform would benefit from the explicit possibility to highlight emerging trends in how people declare 
their desires, wishes and visions on the city relating to cultural heritage, describing the possibility to identify 
opportunities for business, new models, new possibilities to create collaborations, groups, policies and infrastructures. 
There are a lot of different software solutions already used for urban planning. The main issue is that they rely on 
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static data coming from governmental or manually surveyed data sets, or on data coming from users which are already 
aware of the possibility of contributing information using digital tools and networks. The use of a dynamic flow of 
social data is a huge advancement over this current practice as described in the following sections. 
The Project assumption is that by conducting an analysis of data sets based on data extracted from UGC (User 
Generated Content)  there is the possibility to recognize multiple stories, as they emerge, overlap and influence each 
other, unfolding from city users’ mental representations and spatial experiences of city spaces. 
Through the awareness derived from this knowledge the digital platform could empower public administrations, 
private stakeholders and citizens to foster economies of scale for the cultural sector that could determine a spatial 
rooting of the platform in specific urban or rural spaces suitable to host permanent or temporary, profitable or non-profit 
activities linked with the themes of the project. According to this dynamic the digital media initiatives can become 
engine of spatial regeneration. Urban or built heritage in need of regeneration could take advantage from the settlement 
of stakeholders from the cultural sectors. The economical balance can be reached through an equilibrated management 
of profit and no-profit initiatives mixing stakeholders at various scales, sponsors, investors, NGOs, producers, artists, 
beginners, amateurs. A cultural sustainability framework can make the music industry sustain the local emerging 





M.U.S.I.C. aims at reinforcing the awareness of a shared regional culture and setting synergies between formal and 
informal dynamics to foster cultural economies. This means increasing audiences and access to markets and raising the 
interest for investment; fostering administrative skills to better influence their political and economical environment;  
creating new cultural and creative small and medium enterprises; enhancing cooperation synergies among public and 
private stakeholders and citizens. We can resume the main actions of the project in the following list: 
 
- a harvesting engine that collects real-time cultural data streams from geolocalized UGC streams; 
- a web interface that will allow users to perform specific searches within pre-defined domains (e.g. show all the 
content related to ‘places’ within the domain of ‘a kind of music’); 
- a visualizing engine that will generate dynamic infoaesthetic representations on top of standard Google Maps 
visualizations; 
- a mutually interactive set of sounds visualizations which allow operators to move between different analytical 
approaches, leveraging the benefits of each of them toward the creation of valuable interpretations of the 
expressions and behaviours of users in social networks; 
- combination of user profiles information an geospatial data to generate several levels of analysis based on 
selected target groups (residents, tourists, age groups, …) ensuring inclusion of minor groups; 
- an approach focusing on the support of multilingualism at different levels; 
- an urban monitoring tool to set policies and planning initiatives; 
- an urban regeneration strategy to root the intangible aspects of the project into specific places in need of 
economical investments for regeneration.  
 
The gathering of actors around specific nodes will transform them in Mediterranean antennas amplifying and 
transmitting the sound of places to the region and the world promoting cultural and economical exchange among scales 
and countries. The project proposes a global, regional, cross-countries expandable approach. The digital platform could 
become exchange tool among countries and populations, setting the basis for the strengthening of common identity, but 
also for the fostering of contamination and dialogue, protecting differences and minorities. The digital dimension allow 
a widespread access to the cultural contents from the countries involved, but effectively from everywhere, opening an 
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